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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Ten years ago, the police cited Alabama resident Harriet Cleveland multiple 
times for driving without car insurance.1 The state suspended Cleveland’s license 
when she did not pay the fines she was assessed, notwithstanding her apparent 
inability to pay them.2 When Cleveland continued to drive so that she could get 
to work, she received additional tickets.3 By 2013, although she had by then paid 
far more than the total face value of all of her tickets combined and thousands of 
additional dollars to a private probation company, her outstanding debt had 
grown to $2,714,4 leading the court to issue a warrant for her arrest. The police 
arrested her in front of her grandson.5 The next day, the court required that she 
pay a total of $1,554 immediately or serve a 31-day jail sentence.6 Cleveland could 
not pay that amount on the spot, so she was taken straight to jail.7 
Harriet Cleveland’s story is not an outlier. In March 2015, the U.S. Justice 
Department issued a scathing report about police and court practices in the city 
of Ferguson, Missouri, that outlined the systematic criminalization of minor 
infractions, including illegal parking and lawn care violations.8 Fines were high 
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 1. See Amended Complaint at 1, Cleveland v. City of Montgomery, 300 F.R.D. 578 (M.D. Ala. 
2014) (No. 2:13-cv-00732-MEF-TFM) (outlining Cleveland’s story through a complaint filed on her 
behalf by the Southern Poverty Law Center). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 4–5. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 2. 
 8.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 3, 7 (Mar. 
4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_ 
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and failure to pay produced cascading penalties: mounting fines and fees, license 
suspensions, and ultimately jail,9 sometimes even when ten times the initial fine 
amount had already been paid. Fines that require an in-person hearing to resolve 
may also disparately impact those who face greater barriers to physically going 
to court—such as lost wages from shift work, high childcare burdens, and hefty 
transportation costs.10 Unfortunately, Alabama and Missouri are not atypical 
jurisdictions in the United States; there are instances in all 50 states of 
impoverished people being jailed for supposed refusal to pay court debt in what 
the ACLU has coined modern-day debtor’s prisons.11 
In this article, we discuss the challenges of using fines as alternative sanctions, 
even for minor transgressions, when punishing the poor. While fines have 
considerable advantages in the abstract, setting and enforcing fines accurately is 
informationally demanding, particularly when offenders may lack the ability to 
pay them. Current court processes are poorly designed for imposing appropriate 
fines in these circumstances, producing the breakdowns on display in Alabama, 
Missouri, and across the United States. Fines too often counterproductively 
morph into back-breaking debts and even incarceration. Incorporating online 
two-way communication and resolution technology (which we refer to as 
“platform” technology) into the sanctioning process may improve matters: by 
increasing access, offenders may be better able to share critical information; by 
automatically collecting and organizing key data, judges may be better able to 
digest this information; and by standardizing the process and excluding legally 
irrelevant information, decisions may become less prone to implicit biases. After 
explaining how such technology works, we use interview, survey, and case-level 
court data to assess the experiences of the judges, administrators, and litigants of 
six courts that recently adopted an online ability-to-pay (ATP) assessment tool. 
We conclude that such technology has the potential to deliver better access to 
justice, accuracy in outcomes, and efficiency in how courts operate. 
II 
FINES AS ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS 
Low-level violations of law are frequently penalized with fines. Although 
fines are often described as alternative sanctions,12 a sizeable majority of disputes 
between governments and citizens in the U.S. revolve around whether a court 
 
police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7R4-MG3B]. 
 9.  Id. at 3–4. 
 10.  Id. at 48–49; see also SARAH MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE 
PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 21, 85 (Harvard University Press 2009). 
 11.  Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR: ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED (May 19, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-
the-poor [https://perma.cc/QGK3-EFXF]; AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF 
AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS (2010), https://www.aclu.org/report/penny-rise-americas-new-
debtors-prisons [https://perma.cc/B2UM-SH49]. 
 12.  Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 617 (1996). 
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ought to impose a fine and, if so, what amount.13 The attractiveness of fines as a 
way to deter socially costly behavior is rooted in the efficiency of fines relative to 
incarceration and other forms of punishment.14 A fine is a transfer of wealth to 
the government, and therefore the government can use whatever it manages to 
collect to benefit the public—on top of deterring bad behavior, accomplishing 
retributive aims, and so on. By contrast, with the exception of community service, 
most categories of sanctions—for example, incarceration, corporal punishment, 
shaming, et cetera—operate by strategically destroying value, not transferring it 
elsewhere.15 Incarceration may improve welfare, but it is much less welfare-
improving than using fines when both are able to achieve the equally valuable 
purposes of punishment. Using fines as sanctions thus allows us to have our cake 
and eat it too. We can appropriately punish antisocial behavior while covering 
our costs or even earning a profit.16 
Fines do have their drawbacks, however. Society may be inclined to view the 
use of fines as announcing ‘prices’ for engaging in unlawful behavior, a statement 
that implicitly condones conduct that violates another’s rights or harms the public 
so long as one can afford to pay the going rate.17 And, when someone seems likely 
to reoffend, fines may incapacitate poorly. Fines—especially flat fines—may also 
punish in a way that seems less fair than other kinds of sanctions.18 Two weeks in 
jail for a wealthy person and a poor person may appear more equitable than a 
fine that is small change for one person and a week’s wages for another. 
Moreover, imposing fines can sometimes be a little too easy for governments, 
requiring checks on overcriminalization and overpunishment.19 Politicians 
increasingly realize that fine revenue need not be limited to paying for, say, law 
enforcement.20 Fines for trivial transgressions can fund all sorts of public 
projects,21 and those most injured by monetary sanctions (and accompanying add-
 
 13.  Minor disputes (e.g., traffic violations) account for significantly more than half of U.S. state court 
caseloads. J.J. Prescott, Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform Technology, 70 VAND. 
L. REV. 1993, 2001 (2017). 
 14.  Steven D. Levitt, Incentive Compatibility Constraints as an Explanation for the Use of Prison 
Sentences Instead of Fines, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 179, 181 (1997); J.J. Prescott, Criminal Sanctions 
and Deterrence, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (2015) (Jürgen Backhaus, ed.). 
 15.  See Levitt, supra note 14, at 179–80. 
 16.  See R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Considering the Victim, the 
Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1781–84 (2015) (discussing the tradeoffs of using fines). 
 17.  See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1055 (2015). 
 18.  Flat fines are regressive in the sense that the poor pay more than the wealthy per capita in 
relative terms. John Greenfield, Sliding-Scale Fines Could Make Chicago Traffic Enforcement More 
Equitable, CHI. READER (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/traffic-fines-
regressive-fees-solution/Content?oid=23730503 [https://perma.cc/542Y-49QH]. 
 19.  Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1059. 
 20.  Id. at 1098–99. 
 21.  Peter Edelman identifies financial motivations and political imbalances as key sources of the 
current fines-and-fees crises. PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
POVERTY IN AMERICA (2017). Reagan-era cuts created revenue gaps and so “the onus of paying for our 
justice system—from courts to law enforcement agencies and even other arms of government—began to 
shift to” litigants. Id. at xv. Today in the U.S., “ten million people . . . owe a total of $50 billion in 
accumulated fines, costs, fees, charges for room and board in jails and prisons, and other impositions.” 
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on fees) usually have little political clout to resist the creep of revenue-generating 
fines for regulatory violations or malum prohibitum offenses.22 
One critical limitation of using fines as sanctions is that fines can only work 
when violators have sufficient resources to pay the amount they are deemed by 
the state to owe or, alternatively, the ability and opportunity to acquire those 
resources.23 Indeed, a general lack of financial liquidity is, at least for economists, 
the most straightforward reason why criminal justice cannot operate solely on the 
basis of fines. Even if it were politically and morally acceptable, imposing fines 
for serious crimes, such as rape or murder, would be ineffective because the 
appropriate penalty would be so large as to be impossible for many to pay. 
Although liquidity matters less often in the context of small fines for minor 
infractions—the average American can put together a few hundred dollars if 
necessary, even if doing so is difficult24—even these small payments can be 
impossible for someone working paycheck to paycheck. By contrast, this ability-
to-comply requirement is virtually never relevant in the incarceration setting: an 
offender may be ill or infirm, but incarceration of some sort is generally 
possible.25 
Thus, given the broad use of fines as sanctions by governments at all levels 
and the increasing inequality and stubborn poverty in the United States,26 it is 
important to understand how the justice system treats someone who claims to be 
unable to pay a court-ordered fine. An individual’s ability to pay a fine is almost 
never substantively relevant under criminal statutes or ordinances.27 Accordingly, 
when offenders do not pay their fines, the default assumption is that they have 
 
Id. at xiv. In Tulsa, Oklahoma, for example, “about 28 percent of the nearly 23,000 people booked into 
the Tulsa Jail in 2014 were arrested on court debt-related complaints.” Id. at 8. Some criminal-justice 
systems use fines and fees in what some view as unseemly ways. Examples include: (1) Ferguson, 
Missouri, which used to impose a $531 fine for high grass and weeds and (2) Allegan County, Michigan, 
which imposes a $500 fee to help subsidize the costs of the courthouse gym. Id. at 7. 
 22.  As a result, the list of infractions producing fine revenue seems likely to grow over time, and 
policymakers may contribute to this growth by systematically overestimating the appropriate fine 
amounts. See Leah Plunkett, Captive Markets, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 63 (2013) 
 23.  Levitt, supra note 14, at 180. 
 24.  Derek Thompson, Very Sad Graph: How Much Americans Have Left to Spend After Essentials, 
Today, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/08/very-sad-
graph-how-much-americans-have-left-to-spend-after-essentials-today/260606/ [https://perma.cc/JN6Z-
GGYR]. Whether it is a good idea to force people to struggle to pay a fine is a hard question. The struggle 
may make the punishment more effective but may also destabilize lives in ways that counterproductively 
lead to more crime or other social costs. 
 25.  Although the availability of accommodations for disabilities or physical ailments in jail or prison 
settings in some ways mirrors the divide in the fine context, physical health determinations are not left 
to judges to resolve but have instead been outsourced to professionals. 
 26.  See generally Chetty et al., Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in 
Intergenerational Mobility, 104 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 141 (2014); H. Luke Shaefer & 
Kathryn Edin, Rising Extreme Poverty in the United States and the Response of Federal Means-Tested 
Transfer Programs, 87 SOC. SERV. REV. 250 (2013). 
 27.  See Maura Ewing, Why Texas Courts Will Stop ‘Nickel-and-Diming’ the Poor, THE ATLANTIC 
(July 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/texas-court-fines/534363/ 
[https://perma.cc/ YZF7-UEAE] (discussing why the Texas legislature passed a law to curtail the practice 
of jailing those who are unable to pay court-imposed bills). 
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effectively refused to comply with a court order and thus deserve contempt 
sanctions.28 However, the U.S. Constitution prohibits judges from incarcerating 
people who cannot pay fines and fees.29 Ability-to-pay determinations therefore 
primarily arise when a court finds itself in the position of resolving whether it may 
permissibly enforce a prior court order directing a litigant to pay a fine. 
There are two critical inquiries when dealing with someone who does not 
comply with an order to pay a fine. The first is a threshold question: a court must 
determine whether the offender is refusing to pay the fine, but actually has the 
ability to and could voluntarily pay, or whether the offender is unable to pay.30 If 
a court determines that someone is unable to pay a fine, the next question is 
whether there is some way to restructure the sanction—for instance, lowering the 
amount owed or spreading payments out over time—so as to render the offender 
‘able to pay’ the new sanction.31 These inquiries seem simple enough, but gray-
area cases abound.32 For example, consider someone with a $325 fine and $400 in 
the bank but with the $400 budgeted for medicine and groceries. While 
employed, the individual is just getting by and cannot take on more hours at work 
because she is a full-time student and has a disability.33 In such cases, requiring 
full and immediate payment can produce real hardship, with the individual 
sacrificing housing, food, utilities, or other necessities (or the necessities of 
others, like children) to comply.34 The possibility of such hardship reveals not 
only the severity of even a modest fine for those not economically well off,35 but 
also that inaccurately assessed fines can harm third parties, such as family 
members, who are themselves innocent of any violation.36 
Answering these two inquiries accurately for those who are economically 
disadvantaged is an informationally intensive exercise, and courts have not, 
 
 28.  Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
509, 524 (2011); Ed Spillane, Why I Refuse to Send People to Jail for Failure to Pay Fines, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/04/08/why-i-refuse-to-send-
people-to-jail-for-failure-to-pay-fines/ [https://perma.cc/QUV3-RP4P]. 
 29.  Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983). 
 30.  Id. at 667–68. 
 31.  Id. at 672–73. This analysis might also include a consideration of replacing the fine with another 
type of sanction, perhaps one easier to bear with fewer spillover effects: e.g., community service, so long 
as its scheduling does not interfere with the offender’s livelihood. Kahan, supra note 12, at 625–30; Ken 
Pease, Community Service Orders, 6 CRIME & JUST. 51, 51 (1985). 
 32.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 28, at 524–26. 
 33.  In our research, we uncovered this specific scenario and similar ones in which judges needed to 
consider each factor individually—such as the type and extent of a disability—in determining a litigant’s 
ability to pay and/or comply with an alternative sanction such as community service. 
 34.  EDELMAN, supra note 21, at 10. 
 35.  This is the traditional justification for using day fines, which are pegged to an individual’s income 
or wealth to equalize the relative burden across people in different socioeconomic circumstances. See 
Beckett & Harris, supra note 28, at 513–15. 
 36.  We discovered what appear to be significant negative spillovers to children in the cases we study 
in this article. Several litigants expressed having to choose between shelter for their family during winter 
and complying with court-ordered fines. 
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historically, performed the task well.37 The costs of inaccuracy in these 
evaluations can be very high for particular individuals, as evidenced by Harriet 
Cleveland’s tribulations. Unfortunately, these challenging situations are not 
uncommon in the United States. And yet, despite their clear importance, ability-
to-pay determinations as conducted by courts remain essentially unregulated and 
erratic.38 If an offender raises the issue of ability to pay, a court is theoretically 
obligated to make an inquiry,39 but when, how, and by whom is left to individual 
courts to decide. Before turning to platform technology’s potential to improve 
the accuracy of these inquiries, we describe how many of today’s courts conduct 
ability-to-pay determinations and share some evidence that the current approach 
is failing. 
III 
THE CHALLENGE 
The words ‘inefficient’ and ‘unnecessary’ come to mind when reading stories 
about the enforcement of fines and fees in the United States, especially when they 
conclude with the jailing of someone who committed only a civil infraction. Fines 
are a common alternative to incarceration in the context of minor infractions,40 
but local governments routinely spend large amounts of time, money, and effort 
to enforce fines for amounts that, even if received, in the end do not cover the 
enforcement costs themselves, much less bring in positive net revenue.41 Courts 
use various approaches to collect outstanding fines,42 but two of the most 
common strategies are driver’s license suspensions—often regarded as acutely 
 
 37.  Jessica M. Eaglin, Improving Economic Sanctions in the States, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1837, 1853–54 
(2015) (“Moreover, states do not provide meaningful standards or methodologies for ability-to-pay 
determinations. For example, there is no consensus amongst courts as to when or how to determine 
ability to pay.”). 
 38.  See Beckett & Harris, supra note 28, at 511–18. 
 39.  Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines 
Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 833 (2013); see also ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
Standard 18-3.16, at 113 (3d ed. 1994), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/criminal_justice_standards/sentencing.authcheckdam.pdf (“An offender’s ability to pay 
should be a factor in determining the amount of the sanction. Sentencing courts . . . should consider the 
offender’s obligations, particularly family obligations.”) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 40.  See Karin D. Martin et al., Monetary Sanctions: Legal Financial Obligations in U.S. Systems of 
Justice, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 471, 471–95 (2018) (discussing why legal financial obligations are 
routinely imposed for minor offenses); ALEXES HARRIS ET AL., MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2017), http://www.monetarysanctions.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/04/Monetary-Sanctions-Legal-Review-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7NC-HH83]. 
 41.  Matthew Menendez, Fees and Fines Threaten Judicial Independence, ABA J. (Apr. 19, 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/fees_and_fines_threaten_judicial_independence 
[https://perma.cc/22NH-FTXR]; see also Daniel S. Nagin, Thoughts on the Broader Implications of the 
“Miracle of the Cells,” 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 37, 37–42 (2008) (observing that enforcing fines is 
resource intensive). 
 42.  Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the 
Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1759 (2010); DOUGLAS EVANS, THE DEBT PENALTY: 
EXPOSING THE FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO OFFENDER REINTEGRATION 7–8 (Aug. 2014), 
https://jjrec.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/debtpenalty.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2Z2-4V88]. 
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counterproductive because complying with the suspension order interferes with 
one’s ability to earn money to pay the fine and ignoring the order often leads to 
more fines43—and bench warrants, which seek to force compliance with the threat 
of incarceration. When courts use these strategies, even those who begin owing 
small amounts of money can end up in jail. And when the threat of jail results in 
actual jail because the offender does not pay, the efficiency benefits of using fines 
as sanctions evaporate since the costs of jailing someone will often if not virtually 
always exceed the value of any fines the court might eventually recover. 
Although the U.S. Constitution mandates that the imposition of jail time—or 
any additional fine or fee—for noncompliance must be premised on an 
individual’s ability to pay the initial fine,44 the Supreme Court has said little about 
how this assessment must or even should be made by courts.45 Ability-to-pay 
determinations thus operate in an openly ad hoc way (if they operate at all),46 and 
procedures vary dramatically from court to court and from judge to judge.47 An 
example of how this situation translates to practice can be found in a recent 
Michigan State Court Administrative Office report on how to carry out ability-
to-pay determinations: 
The “ability to pay” must be determined and applied on an individual basis. Each judge, 
for each obligor brought before the court for failure to pay a court-ordered financial 
obligation, must review the required facts and circumstances and make an individual 
determination of the obligor’s ability and resources to pay the ordered monetary 
assessments and whether the obligor has made a good-faith effort to pay. Judges may 
have differing philosophies regarding ability to pay and may weigh facts in a given case 
differently. A judge’s discretion is tempered by the confines of the law and should be 
exercised with fairness and restraint. Ultimately, each decision is up to the individual 
judge.48 
For better or worse, judges are not trained in how to assess personal finances, 
identify the indicators of poverty, or evaluate the destabilizing effects of even 
 
 43.  Alicia Bannon et al., Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
(2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KU8T-2EAD]. 
 44.  Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668 (1983) (“If the probationer has willfully refused to pay 
the fine or restitution when he has the means to pay, the State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment 
as a sanction to enforce collection.”). 
 45.  Eaglin, supra note 37, at 1849 (“Judges enjoy a great deal of discretion when imposing economic 
sanctions. Very little guidance exists on how or when to use this sanction.”). 
 46.  In some courts, consideration of a litigant’s ability to pay is an afterthought, at best. EDELMAN, 
supra note 21, at 8 (“In practice ‘the judges don’t make an inquiry before finding that the defendants are 
able to pay. The only thing the judges know about our defendants’ ability to pay is that they are so poor 
they can’t bond out.’ The Tulsa World reported that ‘one woman explained [to the presiding judge] that 
she had to choose between having her electricity cut off and paying her court cost.’ The judge explained 
that the court’s remedies are the same as those of the electric company, only the court’s version is sending 
people to jail.”); see also id. at 11, 29–30, 40. 
 47.  See Eaglin, supra note 37, at 1839–40 (detailing how courts differ in evaluating an individual’s 
ability to pay); Shapiro, supra note 11. 
 48.  See MICH. SUPREME COURT STATE COURT ADMIN. OFFICE: ABILITY TO PAY WORKGROUP, 
TOOLS AND GUIDANCE FOR DETERMINING AND ADDRESSING AN  OBLIGOR’S ABILITY TO PAY 6 
(Apr. 20, 2015) http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/ 
Reports/AbilityToPay.pdf [https://perma.cc/HB9Y-9FFG] [hereinafter MICHIGAN REPORT]. 
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small fines on struggling families.49 Instead, judges are simply directed to do the 
best they can, taking into account their own philosophies of punishment, to 
determine whether an offender is making good-faith efforts to satisfy their fines. 
Judicial discretion need only be tempered by the confines of the law. 
Because there is little consistency with respect to how judges usually make 
ability-to-pay determinations, it is impossible to quantify whether judges as a 
class or as individuals are generally accurate in their assessments—other than by 
looking to the large numbers of people jailed for outstanding fines and to other 
aggregate statistics indicating system failure.50 Many thousands of Americans 
each year face serious sanctions for refusing to pay fines, apparently “choosing” 
to ignore outstanding warrants for their arrest—and therefore denying 
themselves social services and the protection of law enforcement as well as 
regularly going to jail for days, weeks, or even months—rather than pay a few 
hundred dollars that they are assumed to have.51 In some jurisdictions, as many 
as one in five jail inmates are incarcerated for failure to pay court debt.52 These 
outcomes alone belie the idea that all or even most of these people are able, but 
simply refusing, to pay.53 Even if some judges are generally accurate in their 
assessments of a debtor’s ability to pay, we cannot know how much variance there 
is in their accuracy across types of cases and classes of litigants.54 Just as 
important, some judges are likely to be systematically inaccurate, and some 
classes of litigants are likely to be systematically misappraised, perhaps because 
they lack social or cultural common ground with their judge. In this context, 
anecdotes or small sample studies can be informative.55 
 
 49.  See Ruback, supra note 16, at 1806 (“Most courts do not have a written plan for how such a 
determination should be made.”). 
 50.  See, e.g., Eaglin, supra note 37, at 1864 n.176 (discussing how one organization measured Rhode 
Island’s system failure and found that “18% of all jailings were on account of failure to pay court debts,” 
and that each offender owed, on average, $826). 
 51.  Furthermore, if an individual on probation or parole fails to pay a fine in full, judges can—and 
often do—return them to jail. See, e.g., Ebony Ruhland, The Impact of Fees and Fines for Individuals on 
Probation and Parole, ROBINA INST. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/news-
views/impact-fees-and-fines-individuals-probation-and-parole [https://perma.cc/C3ME-5KB5]. 
 52.  COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: 
PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 1 
(Dec. 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_ 
issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/LPY8-B2ZR]. 
 53.  See Spillane, supra note 28; Shapiro, supra note 11. 
 54.  See, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE S. F. BAY AREA, PAYING MORE FOR 
BEING POOR 19 (2017), https://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/LCCR-Report-Paying-More-for-
Being-Poor-May-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/R23G-XREJ] (“[N]o county was able to provide 
information on the criteria used to make ability to pay determinations.”). 
 55.  See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 43, at 21 (discussing how one judge in Illinois determines 
that any defendant who smokes cigarettes is able to pay); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEB., Unequal 
Justice: Bail and Modern Day Debtors’ Prisons in Nebraska, at 29–30 (2016), 
https://www.aclunebraska.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/unequal_justice_2016_12_13.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9S65-E32H] (describing how judges in three Nebraskan counties never inquire into 
ability to pay); Molly Jackson, Michigan Supreme Court Cracks Down on Pay or Stay Imprisonment, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0104/Michigan-
Supreme-Court-cracks-down-on-pay-or-stay-imprisonment [https://perma.cc/6E9U-MG3V] (“One 
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One potential source of inaccuracy in current ability-to-pay determinations is 
the role expected of litigants in the process. Our adversarial system relies on the 
active, full-throated participation of all parties to ensure accurate and fair 
outcomes.56 Yet fear and confusion keep many people out of court altogether, as 
do the financial, physical, and psychological barriers to going to a courthouse in 
person.57 Of course those actually unable to pay fines also cannot afford lawyers, 
and because of the nature of their cases (e.g., fines and civil incarceration), they 
have no right to publicly provided counsel and very little access to legal aid.58 Pro 
se litigants fare notoriously poorly relative to represented litigants.59 
Limited understanding of the justice system and fear of courts and judges may 
also limit a litigant’s willingness to engage fully in any hearing,60 and may inhibit 
a litigant from asserting inability to pay as a defense in the first instance; judges 
will not raise the issue sua sponte.61 Many poor litigants have no idea that they 
cannot lawfully be incarcerated by a court when they are unable to pay.62 More 
knowledgeable litigants, who wish to claim indigency, know they stand before the 
court as defendants, violators, and offenders. In such a posture, these litigants 
may be especially intimidated by judges, bailiffs, and other court officials or 
perhaps unable to communicate effectively because they fear public speaking.63 
As a consequence, they may prefer instead to default in the overly optimistic 
hope that they can successfully avoid courts and the police in the future.64 
 
judge told NPR that he guesses whether a person can pay based on their clothing and appearance.”). 
 56.  Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 
302 (1989). 
 57.  Maximilian A. Bulinski & J.J. Prescott, Online Case Resolution Systems: Enhancing Access, 
Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 205, 222–24 (2016). 
 58.  See Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1084 (“Many courts routinely incarcerate civil contemnors for 
failing to pay fines without giving them a lawyer.”); Louis S. Rulli, On the Road to Civil Gideon: Five 
Lessons from the Enactment of a Right to Counsel for Indigent Homeowners in Federal Civil Forfeiture 
Proceedings, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 683, 697 (2011). 
 59.  Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship—A Legal Crisis and Its 
Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45, 46 (2011); Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to 
Justice, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 37 (2002) (explaining how represented parties usually prevail in litigation 
against pro se litigants). 
 60.  Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 57, at 218–19; Prescott, supra note 13, at 2007–08. 
 61.  States vary in terms of whose burden it is to raise an ability-to-pay issue and the timing of any 
inquiry. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 40, at 16. In Michigan, for example, a litigant is only entitled to an 
ability-to-pay assessment when the imposition of the fine is enforced, not when the judge initially imposes 
the fine, thus leaving the burden on the litigant of both raising the ability to pay issue and proving 
indigence. AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 31. 
 62.  See Joseph Shapiro, Supreme Court Ruling Not Enough to Prevent Debtors Prisons, NPR: 
MORNING EDITION (May 21, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629/supreme-court-ruling-
not-enough-to-prevent-debtors-prisons [https://perma.cc/K4B5-6Q7Z] (explaining how debtor prisons 
were outlawed in the United States over 200 years ago); AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 
48. 
 63.  See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 57, at 229. 
 64.  J.J. Prescott, Assessing Access-to-Justice Outreach Strategies, 174 J. INST. & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 34, 38–39 (2018). 
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Even when litigants are assertive and aware of their rights, those who are poor 
and low-income are more likely to be financially illiterate and inexperienced,65 
making it difficult for them to convince a judge that they are unable to pay a 
particular fine. Indigent individuals often do not have the necessary means—on 
many levels—to present a complete and representative picture of their financial 
situation to a court. Many litigants arrive unprepared and without proper 
supporting documentation,66 leaving judges to make decisions on the basis of 
limited and potentially distorted evidence.67 Moreover, because litigants rarely 
understand the law and substance of the ability-to-pay inquiry, they may fail to 
mention financial factors outside the judge’s specific line of questioning (for 
instance, their partial support of an aging parent or the income fluctuations 
common to gig-based jobs). 
Meanwhile, examples abound of judges using systematically unreliable rules 
of thumb in making their ability-to-pay determinations. For instance, “a judge in 
Illinois asked all defendants if they smoked, and when any said yes, the judge said 
they have the means to pay.”68 A judge in another jurisdiction concluded that a 
“defendant had expensive-looking shoes or the like and therefore must be able 
to pay,” and a “judge in Michigan found that because the defendant had cable 
television he was capable of paying.”69 Judges have been known to consider 
litigants’ sneakers, manicured nails, or even tattoos in their ability-to-pay 
determinations,70 assuming a strong correspondence between litigants’ access to 
resources (including gifts) in the past and their present financial condition. 
Although clothing and appearance can sometimes be relevant to understanding 
a litigant’s financial wherewithal,71 it is not difficult to imagine that cultural 
assumptions about appropriate spending and lifestyle priorities could predispose 
a judge to a particular conclusion and that any such predisposition could vary 
with a litigant’s age, class, race, gender, or national origin.72 
It is also possible that inaccuracy in ability-to-pay determinations stems from 
pervasive judicial confusion about what ability to pay means or that judges simply 
 
 65.  See Annamaria Lusardi & Peter Tufano, Debt Literacy, Financial Experiences, and 
Overindebtedness, 14 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. ECON. 332, 340 (2015). 
 66.  Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
439, 449 (2009). 
 67.  See Painter, supra note 59, at 47 (explaining why judges find it more difficult to make accurate 
determinations in pro se litigation). 
 68.  EDELMAN, supra note 21, at 5. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 48; EDELMAN, supra note 21. 
 71.  See, e.g., John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Crime and Custom in Corporate Society: A 
Cultural Perspective on Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, 5, 9 
(discussing how people draw inferences from an individual’s appearance or clothing). 
 72.  See Olivia C. Jerjian, The Debtors’ Prison Scheme: Yet Another Bar in the Birdcage of Mass 
Incarceration of Communities of Color, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 250 (2017) (“This lack 
of definition has opened up the meaning of ‘ability to pay’ to judges’ subjective interpretations and 
explicit or implicit bias on what that term concretely means, with results that can vary even within the 
same state.”). 
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too often draw knee-jerk inferences that are poorly supported by the facts or are 
just internally inconsistent.73 In Pittsburgh, an analysis of 4,500 failure-to-pay 
cases indicated that in more than 4 out of 5 cases judges failed to meet a basic 
requirement of explaining their conclusion that the defendant had refused to 
pay.74 Furthermore, in 10% of the cases (involving more than 200 defendants), 
judges explicitly noted uncontroverted facts that actually supported a defendant’s 
inability to pay—such as “defendant is homeless[,] unable to pay;” “defendant 
has been evicted;” and “defendant has no income”—in the record documenting 
their decision to incarcerate the defendant for refusal to pay.75 Thus, even if 
courts—in good faith—actively endeavor to assess the ability of litigants to 
comply with their financial penalties in a consistent way, the necessarily ad hoc 
and inaccessible in-person process makes it very difficult for judges to reliably 
divine litigants’ socioeconomic status.76 
All of this inaccuracy in determining ability to pay in our courts generates 
serious social costs. Jailing or fining those who are unable to pay inflates the 
collective price tag of the justice system and creates unnecessary, concentrated 
harm for particular individuals with no compensating social benefits.77 And if 
those who are improperly jailed also lose their jobs or public benefits the social 
cost of inaccuracy is even greater. Additionally and importantly, these errors can 
foster distrust and even hatred toward the justice system as a whole.78 A litigant 
inaccurately found (or assumed) to be able to pay a fine may emerge from the 
experience viewing courts as illegitimate, concluding that courts generally make 
decisions on the basis of mistaken cultural beliefs or aesthetic preferences rather 
than on genuine financial considerations. 
IV 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Thanks to the recent focus on the fines-and-fees crisis by the U.S. Justice 
Department and other organizations,79 policymakers in many states are re-
 
 73.  See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 37 (“Courts across the state are just as 
arbitrary in their handling of probation revocations based on a defendant’s ability to pay fees.”). 
 74.  Kate Giammarise & Christopher Huffaker, Jailed Over Unpaid Fines, Court Costs: Debtors’ 
Prisons?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 24, 2018, 3:01 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/pennsylvania/articles/2018-02-24/jailed-over-unpaid-fines-court-costs-debtors-prisons (on file with 
Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 57. 
 77.  See, e.g., Eaglin, supra note 37, at 1853 (“[T]he additional cost municipalities pay to punish 
debtors may outweigh the amount recovered through collection.”). 
 78.  EDELMAN, supra note 21, at xi. 
 79.  The ACLU has recommended that “consistent guidelines regarding determination of indigence 
and policies for assessing and collecting [legal financial obligations] should be implemented in every 
jurisdiction to guard against arbitrary or racially skewed discrepancies in punishment.” The ACLU report 
further recommends that judges receive (unspecified) training in making ability-to-pay determinations. 
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 11. 
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examining how courts ought to handle ability-to-pay determinations.80 A number 
of recent reforms at the state level aim to reduce arbitrariness and improve 
accuracy by mandating hearings, imposing more robust standards, and providing 
guidance on pertinent ability-to-pay considerations. This Part details a few of 
these reforms, briefly critiques them, and outlines a proposed alternative solution 
based not on legal reform but on online platform technology. 
In May 2016, the Michigan Supreme Court handed down rules that explicitly 
targeted existing weaknesses in state court ability-to-pay hearings.81 The rules 
reiterate that judges must determine ability to pay and may not jail offenders 
unless they find “the defendant is able to comply . . . without manifest hardship 
and . . . has not made a good-faith effort to comply.”82 Courts must evaluate a 
litigant’s ability to pay and must make findings of fact on the record before 
incarceration becomes an option.83 The rules also expound on the relevant 
financial considerations, imbuing them with somewhat more substance. For 
instance, courts are directed to evaluate: “basic living expenses including but not 
limited to food, shelter, clothing, necessary medical expenses, or child support.”84 
In other words, courts must consider the listed categories and yet must also 
explicitly ask whether there are any other types of expenses that ought to be 
counted as “basic living expenses” as part of the ability-to-pay assessment. 
Other states have likewise taken action to provide more structure and clarity 
to the relationship between monetary sanctions and an individual’s ability to 
pay.85 For example, Ohio recently mandated that judges use ability-to-pay bench 
cards, guides that set forth restrictions on the use of incarceration for criminal 
justice debt.86 Confinement is now only available after a determination, following 
a hearing, that the litigant is willfully refusing to pay, and such a determination 
must be accompanied by findings of fact regarding the litigant’s income, assets, 
and debts.87 Colorado now prohibits incarceration “when a defendant is unable 
to pay . . . without undue hardship to himself or herself or his or her 
dependents.”88 Ohio’s requirements may operate to limit judicial discretion, but 
the potential for “racially skewed discrepancies in punishment” remains.89 
 
 80.  See, e.g., Ewing, supra note 27; Joe Duggan & Martha Stoddard, Nebraska Lawmakers Pass Bills 
Dealing with ‘Debtor Prisons,’ Budget and More, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.omaha.com/news/legislature/nebraska-lawmakers-pass-bills-dealing-with-debtor-prisons-
budget-and/article_efe56e87-9704-5afa-992e-c3f0ddbe8235.html [https://perma.cc/YKY9-YUQM]. 
 81.  MICH. SUPREME COURT, ABILITY TO PAY COURT RULE AMENDMENTS MEMORANDUM 
(Aug. 16, 2016), http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/OfficesPrograms/TCS/Documents/TCS% 
20Memoranda/ TCS-2016-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/VB5F-7EGW]. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 2. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 
MD. L. REV. 486, 527–28 (2016). 
 86.  Id. at 529. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 531. 
 89.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 11. 
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Colorado’s reforms seem to improve the prospects of someone being found 
unable to pay when appropriate by explicitly including the negative effects of 
payment on dependents as considerations in judicial determinations.90 However, 
the statute does not define undue hardship, which ensures ongoing ambiguity in 
any hearing.91 
In the end, these reforms are relatively minor. They operate by fine-tuning 
existing law (e.g., adjusting a legal standard), providing behavioral nudges in the 
right direction (e.g., checklists and list-based definitions), and mandating that 
findings of fact be made on the record. Judges retain considerable discretion—
not only in making their final ruling, but in how they structure the process. In 
Michigan, for instance, significant heterogeneity remains in the questions judges 
ask, the evidence judges demand from litigants, and the time judges take to 
collect information and rule on a litigant’s ability to pay.92 This wide variation in 
process likely occurs not only across judges, but even from litigant to litigant 
appearing before the same judge.93 Nor do these reforms address the central role 
that litigants must play in setting the trajectory and shaping the contours of their 
ability-to-pay determination.94 Even when courts are legally obliged to make 
ability-to-pay rulings in every case, litigants must actively participate in their 
hearings to have any chance of succeeding.95 
An alternative approach to improving ability-to-pay determinations is 
technological. Some courts have recently begun to experiment with online 
platform technology, which is designed to improve litigant engagement, process 
consistency, information availability, hearing efficiency, and ultimately decision-
making accuracy. The technology operates by connecting litigants directly to law 
enforcement or court officials, including judges, over the internet using 
computers or mobile devices.96 Thus, it offers an alternative to in-person hearings 
when appearing in court would be burdensome. Platform technology can also 
guide communication, allowing the sharing of information in a structured and 
transparent way.97 For this reason, it has the potential to improve congruence 
across courtrooms and to reduce costly error, even the imposition of undeserved 
 
 90.  Cf. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF COLO., JUSTICE DERAILED: A CASE STUDY OF ABUSIVE 
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES IN COLORADO CITY COURTS 21 n.16 (2017), https://aclu-
co.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/JUSTICE-DERAILED-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA7U-P8FB]. 
 91.  Cf. Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1077–78 (2010) (discussing how 
ambiguities in statutes permits judicial gap-filling). 
 92.  See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 37. 
 93.  See id.; see also Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31 (2007). 
 94.  See Sward, supra note 56, at 312; Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1038 (1975) (“Our courts wait passively for what the parties will present, almost 
never knowing—often not suspecting—what the parties have chosen not to present.”). 
 95.  See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 17 (discussing how judges only make ability-
to-pay determinations “if the defendant appears in court to assert his inability to pay”). 
 96.  Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 57, at 241. 
 97.  See id. at 242–44 (outlining how an online platform system can standardize and enhance court 
processes and judicial decision making). 
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and ineffective jail time,98 and the effects of systemic bias, such as the unfair 
practices documented in Ferguson, Missouri.99 While not yet common, online 
court platform technology is no longer rare and its footprint is growing.100 
In 2017, six courthouses in Michigan—most serving populations with above-
average rates of poverty—implemented platform-based online ability-to-pay 
assessment software: the Matterhorn ATP Assessment Tool.101 Before reporting 
on the measurable experiences these courts have had with the tool, we briefly 
summarize how it operates. Matterhorn is available online at any time of day to 
anyone who has outstanding eligible fines or fees with an adopting court.102 
About 40% of Matterhorn users access the system during nights, weekends, and 
early mornings.103 Litigants begin the online process by entering identifying 
information—their name, date of birth, and driver’s license number—into the 
web-based interface to review their outstanding fines, fees, or warrants. The tool 
then presents users with a series of carefully worded questions to collect critical 
information, using skip patterns and simple algorithms to help litigants provide a 
complete picture of their financial stability to the court.104 
Matterhorn begins by simply asking litigants whether they can pay what they 
owe.105 If a litigant claims to be unable to pay, additional questions explore why 
the litigant reports being unable to pay.106 If the litigant has employment income, 
 
 98.  See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 28 (arguing that New Orleans wastes money 
every day to incarcerate people who will never be able to pay their debts). 
 99.  See Stephen Deere, Chuck Raasch & Jeremy Kohler, DOJ Finds Ferguson Targeted African-
Americans, Used Courts Mainly to Increase Revenue, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 5, 2015), 
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/doj-finds-ferguson-targeted-african-americans-
used-courts-mainly-to/article_d561d303-1fe5-56b7-b4ca-3a5cc9a75c82.html [https://perma.cc/7VEU-
LUVM]. 
 100.  JOINT TECH. COMM., ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR COURTS 1 (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/About%20Us/Committees/JTC/JTC%20Resource%20Bulleti
ns/2017-12-18%20ODR%20for%20courts%20v2%20final.ashx [https://perma.cc/BJ2ETJNE]. 
Matterhorn, one of the earliest court-based platform communications systems, has contracts as of this 
writing with approximately forty courts in eight states and has supported the resolution of tens of 
thousands of cases. MATTERHORN, https://getmatterhorn.com/ [https://perma.cc/24BY-7TPH] (last 
visited July 5, 2018). Matterhorn is now used in both district and circuit courts to resolve many types of 
disputes by facilitating communication and reducing the burden of litigation. 
 101.  Please note again that Prescott has a proprietary interest in the Matterhorn ATP Assessment 
Tool and its owner, Court Innovations Inc. 
 102.  Some eligible litigants—especially indigent ones—may be unable to access the tool because they 
lack access to the internet. Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 57, at 236. Importantly, all litigants remain 
eligible for a traditional in-person assessment if they do not have internet access. 
 103.  We calculated these operations statistics using user data from courts adopting the ATP 
assessment tool as a separate platform through April 3, 2018. All calculations are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 104.  The system populates the tool with information available from other sources, including court 
records, and in the long run, the tool is likely to be linked to other government agency databases, making 
data collection even more straightforward. 
 105.  This question takes different forms, including, “Can you pay X within X timeframe?”; “What is 
your plan of payment?”; and “How much can you afford and how often?” 
 106.  These questions include: “Are you in bankruptcy?”; “Do you have income from a source that is 
not government assistance?,” in which government assistance is specifically defined; and “Do you have 
assets such as savings/investment accounts or property?” 
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the tool asks the litigant to categorize their status (for example, full-time, part-
time), and then to provide a total income estimate. If the litigant reports no 
income, the system asks the litigant to account for that fact.107 Depending on these 
answers, the assessment tool may follow with questions about the litigant’s 
current sources of cash or any other periodic support—whether from family, 
friends, loans, or odd jobs—for acquiring necessities. The tool also collects 
detailed information about the litigant’s assets, if any: real-estate equity, vehicles, 
savings, and investments. It then turns to expenses: first, personal expenses in the 
last month, including clothing, personal care, dining out, and entertainment; 
second, general expenses, including dependent children, any mortgage or rent 
amounts, utilities, insurance, healthcare costs, loan payments, child support, and 
alimony.108 Finally, the assessment tool asks the litigant to list any special 
circumstances about which the court should be aware, giving the litigant an 
opportunity to supply—at length, in their own words, on their own time, and 
while in a setting of their own choosing—any reasons why their answers to the 
previous questions regarding income, assets, and expenses might paint an 
inaccurate financial picture. 
The assessment tool automatically distills all of these data into key summary 
indicators that are made available online to the judge examining the case.109 This 
summary information includes what aims to be an objective assessment of how 
the litigant’s financial circumstances compare to various definitions of poverty, 
and also presents aggregated information on income, assets, and expenses, along 
with basic details about the litigant’s employment status and extenuating 
circumstances. The litigant’s written communications with the court are cleanly 
organized for judicial review, and the judge is free to explore all of the original 
answers to any question, along with any supporting documents, which litigants 
can easily upload directly to the court using their mobile device or computer.110 
Ultimately, there is nothing revolutionary about the idea that using 
technology in this way can facilitate ability-to-pay determinations. Yet there are 
several reasons to believe that implementing such technology, like Matterhorn, 
may improve outcome accuracy relative to other proposed reforms. First, it 
makes the ability-to-pay determination less burdensome, scary, and confusing for 
 
 107.  The tool asks: “Are you able to work?”; “Have you ever been employed?”; “Are you currently 
unemployed?”; “What kind of work have you done in the past?”; and “Do you need help finding work?” 
 108.  The system also allows courts to explicitly direct litigants to submit necessary documentation for 
these entries online, which litigants can do using a mobile phone camera. 
 109.  See Guthrie et al., supra note 93, at 35–36 (arguing that “judges facing cognitive overload due to 
heavy dockets or other on-the-job constraints are more likely to make intuitive rather than deliberative 
decisions” and that courts therefore need to reform and simplify procedures in order to make more 
considered decisions). 
 110.  By design, a platform-based ability-to-pay determination does not involve the judge orally 
asking the litigant questions in a face-to-face setting (maybe the same questions the judge has asked a 
thousand times—or worse, maybe different questions, in light of the litigant’s appearance or the judge’s 
mood). Nor does it involve the judge recording any of the litigant’s answers, collecting copies of litigant 
documents, or other time-consuming but administrative tasks that distract from the key decisions to be 
made. These are all accomplished by the tool directly. 
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litigants; and by doing so, it encourages them to participate more often and allows 
them to do so more effectively.111 Second, it offers a consistent, standardized 
approach to gathering data, one that seeks to balance building a comprehensive 
picture against overwhelming litigants with a never-ending series of inquiries.112 
Consequently, litigants are more likely to supply judges with what they need to 
make an accurate decision.113 Third, the online process saves judges time by 
collecting and assembling the most relevant data in advance, mitigating any urge 
judges might have to skip steps or to choose speed over accuracy.114 This 
technology-based approach, which can be incrementally improved over time, will 
almost always produce a more comprehensive record than the ordinary bare-
bones in-person hearings that characterizes typical ability-to-pay processes 
today, and it gives judges the room they need to bring their expertise to bear 
when it is most helpful. Fourth, the process is fixed in advance and therefore 
applied equally to everyone, regardless of race, gender, or class,115 and the entire 
exchange between the litigant and the court can be recorded for later audit.116 
V 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this part, we summarize the early experiences of six Michigan courts that 
adopted the Matterhorn online platform for ability-to-pay determinations. Our 
goal is very modest. We are interested in whether platform technology has the 
potential to improve accuracy through better litigant access, enhanced data 
collection and aggregation, greater consistency, and less susceptibility to implicit 
bias. Our work has significant limitations. We explore a single ability-to-pay 
assessment platform as implemented in six courts in a single state. We examine 
the experiences of early-adopter courts, which are unlikely to be representative 
or helmed by typical judges. All opinions and outcomes are preliminary ones, 
based on short experiences and often very little data. Unlike other court platform 
technology studies,117 we are unable to use system implementation timing to study 
differences in outcomes post-adoption. 
Studying the accuracy of ability-to-pay determinations in this setting is a 
particular challenge because we have no objective measure of outcome accuracy 
in our data (i.e., we cannot tell whether a judge “got it right”). Consequently, 
 
 111.  See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 57, at 219 (noting that cognitive hurdles in the legal process 
“may ultimately culminate in [litigants] choosing (perhaps subconsciously) to ignore their legal issues”). 
 112.  Id. at 229 (explaining how online platform technology helps overcome some of the challenges of 
collecting information from litigants in a courtroom). 
 113.  Id. at 230. 
 114.  Id. at 244. 
 115.  Id. at 248 (finding that the online platform technology “may be able to provide a judge with all 
the information that he needs to resolve the case accurately, while obscuring information that is useless 
or that might introduce impermissible bias into the decision-making process.”). 
 116.  Id. at 213–14. 
 117.  See, e.g., Prescott, supra note 13; Prescott, supra note 64. 
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many traditional evaluation methods are infeasible.118 To assess the potential of 
platform tools to improve outcome accuracy, we instead rely on various proxies 
and employ a mixed methods analysis, compiling evidence from semi-structured 
qualitative interviews of key court personnel, participant observation, surveys, 
and case-level court information. This multi-faceted strategy has advantages 
when evaluating small intensive pilot projects and offers flexibility when 
analyzing a dynamic relationship between a private actor (Matterhorn’s 
developer), state actors (the six courts and their administrators and judges), and 
the public.119 However, in this preliminary work, we must lean heavily on judge- 
and litigant-reported satisfaction and related reactions to the platform-based 
approach as rough proxies for accuracy in ability-to-pay determinations. Not 
surprisingly, there are many good reasons to question the strength of any 
assumed correlation between participant satisfaction and outcome accuracy.120 
Consequently, our empirical contribution is limited. We recommend drawing, at 
most, tentative lessons from this exercise and instead encourage readers to 
formulate testable hypotheses on the basis of our data to lay the groundwork for 
future research. 
The study begins with the launching of the Matterhorn ATP Assessment Tool 
in six pilot state district courts.121 Five of the six courts had prior experience using 
technology of this sort to resolve cases. All platform launches occurred within the 
last two years; our data collection took about three months and began before any 
court had been using the platform for more than a year.122 Our sample courts 
serve mostly diverse urban areas,123 which have average poverty rates ranging 
from 16–50%.124 Common disadvantages facing these litigant populations include 
difficulty speaking English and physical disability—concrete barriers to 
 
 118.  An alternative approach would be to look at long-run outcomes that would allow us to infer 
earlier accuracy, such as reduced jail time imposed for outstanding fines and fees, but we were unable to 
collect these data, and our sample period was also relatively short. 
 119.  WILLIAM G. AXINN & LISA D. PEARCE, MIXED METHOD DATA COLLECTION STRATEGIES 
(2006). 
 120.  For example, judges may report satisfaction with online platforms because they reduce time-
consuming, in-person hearings, while litigants may report satisfaction because they believe they are able 
to obtain more favorable (but not necessarily more accurate) outcomes. 
 121.  Court 1 launched on March 15, 2017. Court 2 launched on April 15, 2017. The four remaining 
courts, separate courthouses that are part of a single district court, launched on August 1, 2017. All courts 
were district courts dedicated to traffic and lower-penalty infractions. The ATP assessment tool in Courts 
3, 4, 5, and 6 was integrated directly into a warrant resolution solution, meaning that only individuals with 
outstanding warrants had access to the online tool. 
 122.  Specifically, in January, February, and March of 2018, at which point each court had used the 
online court software regularly for at least five months. One implication of the short post-period is that 
the patterns we detect may only represent short-term effects. 
 123.  The exceptions are two smaller courts—one in a rural and one in a suburban region—that use 
the ATP assessment tool as part of a larger district court adoption. These courts represent a small fraction 
of our sample in terms of litigant population (approximately 5%), but their use of the tool at all hints that 
even affluent jurisdictions serve litigants who can benefit from remote ATP determinations. 
 124.  We calculated the demographics of our sample jurisdictions using American Community Survey 
data. See U.S. Census Bureau Factfinder, accessed Apr. 10, 2018. All calculations are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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navigating the judicial system—as well as poverty, as indicated by the common 
receipt of government benefits. 
We interviewed all seven key court personnel (judges, magistrates, and court 
administrators)125 that used the Matterhorn assessment tool at the time of this 
evaluation.126 Five interviews were conducted in person and two were conducted 
over the phone.127 We audio recorded and took notes intermittently throughout 
every interview. Interviews averaged seventy minutes in length. All participants 
walked us through the online process in their court, with one judge inviting us to 
observe her as she deliberated over and resolved actual cases in real time using 
the platform assessment tool.128 During this 75-minute participant observation we 
were able to monitor how the judge handled ability-to-pay determinations at 
every step—as well as the ultimate decisions and forms of relief offered. All 
statements we report below are verbatim, with the exception of statements 
collected during the participant observation, which are as close to exact as 
possible given the judge’s request that we not record any identifying information 
or other highly specific data regarding individual cases. 
The interviews and our observations indicate that judges are generally quite 
enthusiastic about using online technology to assess ability to pay. Decision-
maker enthusiasm is of course not tantamount to improved accuracy. However, 
this judicial satisfaction appears to derive from features of the assessment tool 
that make judges more confident in the accuracy of their decisions. Judges 
emphasize the tool’s ease of use and the fact that comprehensive, relevant data 
are conveniently delivered all to one place. Judges also maintain that the tool 
promotes the development of a standard process for resolving ability-to-pay 
determinations, enhancing consistency across cases. Finally, judges report less 
unproductive back-and-forth with litigants relative to open court, fewer searches 
for paper documents, and greater litigant understanding of the process. These 
effects all translate to requests being handled sooner, mitigating the costs that 
deter litigants from invoking their rights. All of these themes, which we discuss 
in more depth below, can be seen in one judge’s account: 
 
 125.  Subjects averaged 50 to 59 years old. Most were female. All judges and magistrates who adopted 
the assessment tool were female. Two court administrators were male. All were American-born, non-
Hispanic white, and highly educated. Two identified as Independents, one as a Democrat, and the others 
declined to identify with any particular political party. 
 126.  For examples of purposive sampling in studying courts, see Rhys Hester, Judicial Rotation as 
Centripetal Force: Sentencing in the Court Communities of South Carolina, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 203, 203–
35 (2017); Matthew Clair & Alix S. Winter, How Judges Think About Racial Disparities: Situational 
Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 332, 337–40 (2016). 
 127.  O’Neil conducted all interviews, surveys, and data compilation. As a founder, equity holder, and 
board member of Court Innovations, Prescott had and continues to have a conflict of interest in any 
evaluation of Matterhorn online platform tools (including the ATP assessment tool), and so in addition 
to disclosing this conflict, we limited Prescott’s exposure to participants and his involvement in data 
collection and analysis whenever possible. 
 128.  For a well-regarded application of this same approach, albeit with a larger sample, see Issa 
Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. SOC. 351, 359 (2013). 
Although identifying information was revealed during the ethnographic portion of the evaluation, we 
only recorded pseudonyms. 
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We have these baskets with tickets. Well, first I receive a request on my system, at which 
point my clerk pulls the ticket and places it in this basket [points to basket, picks up the 
phone and calls the clerk] “Jaime, please get me the Smith ticket for my inbox, ok, 
thanks?” [Clerk comes in momentarily with printed ticket stamped with a note on the 
bottom directing people to access ATP on the court’s website if they are unable to pay 
the fine in full]. I don’t keep it in the “in basket” for long. The system reminds me how 
long it’s been since the case opened and I like to wrap it up within a day or so, providing 
the defendant my response right away so we can proceed. It’s definitely faster than what 
we do in-house. See here [judge holds up the ticket] this driver is driving a new car, so 
she has some money, but here in the system she tells me about being in school full-time, 
her disability, her overhead, and how little she makes, etc. Oh, and look at her age, she’s 
just a kid, lives with her parents. [Judge begins adding figures out loud—$120 insurance, 
$65 groceries, $289 tuition . . . .] I’m going to offer her a six-month payment plan, at $50 
a month. As soon as she makes the first payment, we drop her warrant. Just like that! 
In the “out basket” for the clerk to file.129 
Despite the variation in the populations served by these courts and the fact that 
different courts have different needs, judges offered similar positive opinions 
regarding the Matterhorn assessment tool during the interviews. In essence, 
judges claimed that the assessment tool made their decisions better and improved 
the process for both court personnel and litigants.130 
Importantly, the judges we interviewed report feeling better informed when 
they use the online assessment tool to appraise ability to pay. Our subjects 
explicitly remark that the tool delivered more and better information relative to 
an in-person hearing, giving judges more to consider in most situations. 
Admittedly, people can be very poor judges of whether their performance has 
improved in response to a change in their information environment.131 Judges 
who perceive that the assessment tool provides more comprehensive information 
in a distilled and easier-to-digest format may be lulled into false optimism about 
their decision-making accuracy.132 Nevertheless, we believe these reactions are at 
least somewhat informative, given the objective reasons to believe that the tool 
presents better information to judges and that judges are able to spend less time 
and effort collecting, organizing, and reviewing information and more time 
deliberating. 
Relatedly, judges report that the platform-based assessment tool makes the 
ability-to-pay determination and sanction resolution process both easier and 
more efficient. Despite providing judges with more—and more comprehensive—
information, the tool also streamlines information acquisition, organization, and 
 
 129.  Qualitative sociological interview-based studies rely on sometimes lengthy quotations as 
evidence of interviewer’s experience in lieu of quantitative metrics, which are less practical in small-
sample studies. See, e.g., Pete Simi et al., Addicted to Hate: Identity Residual Among Former White 
Supremacists, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 1167, 1173 (2017). 
 130.  This positive impression may have spawned interest in using platform technology to handle 
other court matters and spontaneous suggestions of other ways such technology might improve court 
operations. The six sample courts have also adopted several other online tools, including software that 
assists litigants in regaining their driver’s license after a suspension. 
 131.  Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. 
GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 188–89 (1998). 
 132.  See Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1994) (describing how judges 
can have a “false sense of confidence in their decisions”). 
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processing, producing generally faster determinations relative to in-person 
hearings. One judge commented: 
Some ATP cases take me two-to-three minutes to make my determination, some take 
more, depends on the circumstances. I get more info, better info from [the assessment 
tool]. Like, I don’t want to embarrass people in a public hearing. When a defendant is 
standing before me in open court and begging for a payment plan because they are 
disabled and been out of work for long period of time . . . with the ATP system they can 
share with me—and they do—and I can respond accordingly. Like if they provide me 
with an indication of having [Social Security Income] and tell me they struggle with 
transportation to the court because of their heart condition, I now have more facts with 
which I can make a determination what type of community service the court may want 
to offer, if any, and understand the need for a payment plan. [133] When I have a full 
house, there is no way I have time to assess people’s needs in the way I can using the 
ATP program. Two-to-three minutes, the system streamlines it, giving me exactly the 
info I ask for and the defendant also has the option to write me a note and they do, 
many of them anyhow. 
Our interview data also reveal a number of unanticipated benefits from courts 
using platform technology to conduct their ability-to-pay determinations. For 
example, many judges were pleased that the tool’s technology allows for easy 
adjustments to the online procedure, both large and small, even after the launch 
of the platform. This attribute delivers the potential to encourage, reward, and 
institutionalize incremental accuracy-enhancing improvements in the ability-to-
pay assessment process as well as in how the software operates. 
Developer responsiveness, of course, is not intrinsic to an online platform 
approach, but flexibility and adaptability is an innate aspect of using software to 
carry out court tasks.134 In contrast to in-person hearings, where judicial flexibility 
raises concerns about the inconsistent treatment of litigants, the fact that judges 
can lock in improvements to their own processes, which would then apply 
consistently to all litigants before that judge, encourages refinements and 
attention to potential enhancements that, if successful, can become standard 
practice.135 Such improvements can be shared with other judges, too, boosting the 
diffusion of beneficial ideas. Likewise, subtle process problems need only be 
identified once by a single decision-maker to be remedied system-wide.136 
Our interview data indicate that judges, magistrates, and court administrators 
would generally welcome a responsive, evolving solution to case processing and 
resolution, especially in the particular context of high-volume, low-stakes cases.137 
Collectively, our subjects report that they too often face bureaucratic barriers to 
change, dampening their interest in developing better approaches to their tasks, 
 
 133.  One judge stated that offering community service as an alternative sanction was challenging 
without knowing the litigant’s limitations, if any: for example, she did not want to offer street clean-up 
to someone physically disabled as it may not be respectful of their needs and/or limitations. 
 134.  See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 57, at 243 (describing how the envisioned online platform is 
adaptable to the users’ needs); Prescott, supra note 13, at 2022 n.157. 
 135.  See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 57, at 226–27 n.114 (explaining how online platform systems 
allow for frequent updates and modifications). 
 136.  See id. at 244 (arguing that platform technology will facilitate transparency across courts, given 
the data-sharing components of these systems). 
 137.  See Prescott, supra note 13, at 2031 n.187. 
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which may in turn have long-term consequences for outcome accuracy. They view 
platform technology as at least a partial solution to this problem. Importantly, 
however, our interview population is unrepresentative; it comes only from early-
adopter courts and is almost certainly biased in favor of technology adoption and 
innovation. Even so, the ability of software generally to guide, refine, and 
animate legal procedures suggests that platform technology affords us an 
opportunity to transform how courts operate on the ground by encouraging 
regular experimentation and incremental improvement.138 
Finally, the interview data also reveal that there are spillover benefits to using 
platform technology that are not directly related to the accuracy of online 
determinations or to the benefits enjoyed by other litigants. For instance, online 
platform technology has the propensity to reduce crowding and delay in 
courthouses. Judges view this as an unanticipated, but critically important, 
positive outcome.139 As one judge elaborated: “ATP reduces the number of 
people in the building, which increases safety. It definitely shortens the 
dockets. . . .” Fewer people waiting in and around courtrooms makes for a more 
comfortable, less hurried environment,140 which may promote more accurate 
decision making. Judges also have more time to conduct in-person hearings, and 
litigants are less rushed to make their arguments and present their evidence, 
presumably increasing a court’s capacity for accurate outcomes.141 
To complement our interview data, we also surveyed our subjects.142 Surveys 
have demonstrated value in criminal justice research as a cost-effective and rapid 
mechanism for gaining insight into judicial beliefs, decision making, and 
behavior.143 We readily admit that interviewing and surveying the same subjects 
 
 138.  To be clear, such a transformation is by no means certain, at least in the short run. Some of the 
same barriers to change that make platform software like the assessment tool so potentially valuable are 
also sure to hinder the adoption of the technology itself. For instance, one magistrate asserted that many 
judges are allergic to change and have a particular aversion to technology. So, while it is clear that the 
traditional in-person approach to measuring ability-to-pay is failing, it is far less clear how willing judges 
will be to reform the measurement process if doing so means transforming their jobs in ways that are 
unfamiliar or even scary. Charles W. Nihan & Russell R. Wheeler, Using Technology to Improve the 
Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 1981 BYU L. REV. 659, 663–64; Fred Galves, Where the 
Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for 
Institutional Reform and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 169–70 (2000). 
 139.  Each interviewee commented on the benefits of having fewer litigants in the courthouse at any 
time and on how this improved public safety and reduced costs for security personnel. Presumably, a less-
crowded courthouse also improves litigant comfort levels, as well. 
 140.  See Prescott, supra note 13, at 2031 n.187 (suggesting that the implementation of platform 
technology could reduce delays for all litigants—including those that do not use the technology). 
 141.  See id. at 2020 (explaining how online platform technology allows parties to communicate and 
resolve cases in a virtual space). 
 142.  We acknowledge that we were only able to survey seven individuals from what are likely to be 
unrepresentative, early-adopter courts. Although we take some comfort in the facts that we surveyed the 
full universe of court personnel who were heavily involved in the Matterhorn pilot and that the evidence 
we discuss are the unanimous or near-unanimous views of the subjects, the potential for sampling bias is 
high and readers should view all results with a decent measure of caution. 
 143.  See, e.g., Shawn Bushway et al., An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial,” 
52 CRIMINOLOGY 723, 723–54 (2014); Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking 
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necessarily double counts evidence to some extent by relying repeatedly on the 
same source. Still, there are good methodological reasons for surveying and 
interviewing subjects in this context. First, we were able to ask a number of 
questions more carefully and easily using the survey format—and ask the same 
questions of each respondent with the same wording and in the same order.144 
Second, we distributed the survey to our respondents before we conducted the 
interviews, and the answers we received to our questions allowed us to more 
effectively develop a strategy for our open-ended, one-on-one meetings. We 
therefore believe the survey evidence we present ought to be accorded some 
weight, despite the double counting implicit in doing so. 
Consistent with our interview data, survey takers unanimously report that the 
ability-to-pay assessment tool saved time for judges and courts and provided 
better, faster access to justice for litigants relative to the traditional in-court 
process. All but one respondent found the online assessment tool to be a 
comparable or more comprehensive way to evaluate litigants’ ability to pay. Our 
judge and magistrate respondents agreed with the statement that the tool “can 
help keep people out of jail,” suggesting an awareness that some people sent to 
jail for failure to pay a court debt are presently misclassified, either because those 
people never sought or received an ability-to-pay determination or because their 
in-person hearings somehow came to the wrong conclusion. Judges also believe 
that compliance rates with the online tool are the same or higher relative to 
standard practices, and that “some to half” of litigants would not be able to 
successfully resolve their ability-to-pay dispute without access to the tool. 
Most respondents contend that the tool is easier to use and less biased than 
in-person ability-to-pay determinations. Specifically, judges feel that minorities, 
the elderly, the disabled, and non-English speakers obtain better access to justice 
using the assessment tool. As part of the survey, our respondents completed a 
photo-matching vignette exercise,145 a set of tasks known for its ability to identify 
bias and obtain potentially more honest answers on controversial topics.146 
Respondents examined photographs that depicted people of varying ages and 
skin tones in situations illustrating various themes including substance abuse, 
military service, physical disability, homelessness, domestic violence, and obesity. 
We asked respondents to indicate, upon first instinct, whether the subjects could 
benefit from the assessment tool.147 There was broad consensus that the tool 
 
the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1366–69 (2009). 
 144.  The survey also involved an exercise that would not have translated well to an interview setting. 
 145.  For examples of how this methodology can be used, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does 
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1217–18 (2009); Taylor 
Jillian Altman, A Crime at Any Age: Intimate Partner Abuse in Later Life, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1543, 1552 
(2017). 
 146.  Rhidian Hughes & Meg Huby, The Construction and Interpretation of Vignettes in Social 
Research, 11 SOC. WORK & SOC. SCI. REV. 36, 45–46 (2004); Guillermina Jasso, Safeguarding Justice 
Research, 41 SOC. METHODS & RES. 217, 217–39 (2012). 
 147.  Gillian Bendelow, Pain Perceptions, Emotions and Gender, 15 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 273, 
278–79 (1993); PRANEE LIAMPUTTONG, RESEARCHING THE VULNERABLE: A GUIDE TO SENSITIVE 
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could mitigate hidden biases, at least with regard to age, appearance, gender, 
minority status, and physical disability.148 
The survey data also show that our judge respondents believe they can 
communicate more directly and candidly with litigants when using the tool. 
Judges confess feeling more comfortable raising sensitive topics with litigants—
like disability, addiction, and mental health—that could be embarrassing to 
discuss in open court. Judges also indicate using the tool to make referrals to 
Alcoholics Anonymous, legal aid, social services, and mental health centers. All 
but one judge expressed interest in making such referrals a built-in option to 
consider during the online ability-to-pay determination process to further 
improve their communication with litigants. Judges report significant concern 
that litigants often have untreated mental health and substance use disorders that 
interfere with their compliance, employment, and ability to pay. 
While the experiences that judges, magistrates, and court administrators 
describe having had with the Matterhorn assessment tool are useful in 
understanding platform technology’s potential to improve the accuracy of ability-
to-pay determinations, the views and experiences of litigants are equally if not 
more important. Accuracy relies critically on litigant participation and 
engagement in the ability-to-pay determination process. To better understand 
litigants’ experiences, we examined responses to a survey sent electronically to 
all litigants who used the ability-to-pay assessment tool three days after a judge 
decided their case. The nine-question survey investigates the value of remote 
court access and the fairness of the online process, and asks whether the litigant 
would have been able to appear in court in the absence of the online tool. 
As we previously stated, our litigant user survey sample size is very small, and 
so the evidence we present is merely suggestive.149 Nevertheless, the data support 
a first-blush positive appraisal of the online assessment tool. Over 75% of all 
respondents indicate that they would not have been able to appear in court had 
the court not made the tool available. As a proxy for compliance, this figure 
suggests that just 25% of respondents would have been able to satisfy their initial 
alleged legal obligation.150 One litigant described feeling helpless as he set off to 
deal with his outstanding warrant: “I was desperate to handle the situation and 
began using google.” After obtaining a payment plan using the Matterhorn tool, 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 141–47 (2007). 
 148.  One judge reported that she did not want addicts using the software, preferring to see them in 
person to ensure they were “serious about treatment” before considering relief. 
 149.  At the time of our analysis, the developer had electronically sent surveys to 238 individuals. 
Twenty-nine people had returned the survey as of April 13, 2018, a response rate of over 12%. Our 
sample is necessarily a selected one as only those who experimented with the online process and 
completed their request for relief received a survey. The survey asked litigants how they had heard about 
the online assessment program. Responses were varied, and included a postcard, the back of a parking 
ticket, a clerk referral, a friend referral, a generic web search, and the court’s website. 
 150.  This is a conservative number given that only 25% of these litigants estimated they would have 
been able to come to court at all. We care more about the percentage of litigants who would have 
successfully navigated the court’s in-person process for receiving an ability-to-pay determination, which, 
it is worth mentioning, frequently requires multiple visits. 
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the court withdrew his original warrant. Moreover, he found the tool easy to use: 
“[W]alk in court hours, for years, has been very inconvenient. Had it not been for 
this tool I don’t know when I would have been able to handle my tickets!” 
Almost 80% of all respondents felt that their case had been handled fairly.151 
Given that all of these respondents owed money, and some were facing arrest 
warrants, the fact that 23 of the 27 people who answered the survey question 
viewed the process as fair is promising. One respondent emphasized how the 
traditional approach, which would have required him to miss work, seemed 
counterintuitive—as a shift worker, he would not have received paid time off and 
could have been fired for taking time to go to court, which would have decreased 
his ability to pay his fines.152 By contrast, after using the online platform, he felt 
that his case was handled fairly, that he understood the status of his matter 
throughout the process, and that he would encourage others to use the platform. 
We admit, however, that litigants’ perceptions of fairness may poorly track 
accuracy in ability-to-pay assessments. In particular, litigants who receive 
especially lenient treatment, including those who have intentionally and 
illegitimately attempted to avoid payment by failing to disclose income or assets, 
may be inclined to describe the system as fair,153 even as they contribute to a 
different sort of inaccuracy in their ability-to-pay determination.154 
To better understand the consequences of the online tool, especially with 
respect to accuracy, we turn now from litigant survey responses to case-level 
 
 151.  This estimate is calculated by dividing the number of respondents who viewed the process as fair 
by the total number of respondents (23/29 = 79.3%). Dividing instead by the number of those who 
actually answered the fairness question, 27, produces an estimate of 85.2%. No respondent indicated that 
they found the process to be unfair; instead, the remaining four respondents reacted neutrally to the 
question. We ought to note that all of these respondents and almost all of the users of the assessment tool 
during this pilot—even those who did not answer the survey question—received some limited form of 
relief in response to their submission, most often an agreement to a payment plan, but also sometimes 
the replacement of their owed fines with a community service sanction or a rescheduled court date in the 
case of a missed court appearance. Courts never or almost never waived a litigants’ obligation entirely. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that respondents are more likely to view the online assessment process as fair 
if they receive some, albeit limited, relief, less weight should be placed on these estimates. See Youyang 
Hou et al., Factors in Fairness and Emotion in Online Case Resolution Systems, PROC. 2017 CHI CONF. 
ON HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS. 2511, 2516–17 (finding a correlation between perceived fairness 
and a positive case outcome in a similar setting). 
 152.  The respondent wrote: “Now I have to miss 2 days of work over some tickets I could have paid 
online. . . now if I loose [sic] my job how would I be able to pay anything?” 
 153.  See supra note 151. 
 154.  Indeed, one potential direction for future work would be to examine whether litigants are 
strategic in their response to the availability of an online ability-to-pay assessment tool, and, in particular, 
whether an online ability-to-pay assessment tool encourages a second sort of inaccuracy by making it 
easier for some litigants to effectively cheat the system. Among other things, litigants may be less able to 
prepare for the traditional ad hoc process currently in place, and they may be less willing or able to lie 
about their means while in open court in the presence of a judge or magistrate. Relatedly, as online 
platform software becomes standardized, it is possible that litigants will be able to more easily obtain and 
share information about how to manipulate the system to obtain favorable results. At the same time, 
platform technology, as it evolves, will likely allow courts of the future to more efficiently and 
comprehensively tap other sources of financial data and request verifying information to adequately 
corroborate a litigant’s claims. 
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litigants and court data, as well as the statements submitted by 163 litigants to 
court while actually using the Matterhorn tool. The average annual income of 
these tool users was $11,604. These litigants typically had multiple unresolved 
issues along with their associated fines and fees. The average debt owed was in 
the $400 to $500 range, and litigants usually had one or more outstanding arrest 
warrants for failure to pay or appear.155 In these 163 cases, judges completed the 
online ability-to-pay assessments quickly. Successful litigants were given a 
payment plan or alternative sanctions, and were thus back in compliance, on 
average, within four to five days of their seeking relief. For these 163 early users, 
across all six courts, requesting an ability-to-pay assessment using the online tool 
almost always ended with all of their outstanding warrants being withdrawn. 
Helpfully, the online assessment tool asks litigants whether they have any 
special circumstances that the court should consider during their ability-to-pay 
determination. In what follows, we catalog direct quotations from their court 
submissions.156 It is apparent that most if not all of these individuals would have 
been treated by the system as if they were able to pay had they not had access to 
the online assessment tool for the simple reason that very few of these litigants 
would likely have overcome the traditional access barriers to request relief in 
person. Housing insecurity, bankruptcy, and unemployment were familiar 
themes, and some extreme measures (e.g., use of shelters, selling plasma) are 
certainly symptomatic of inability to pay. At a minimum, these litigants would 
have had to come to court for hours to make their case. 
Shirley, 43: “I am a family of 5 with a disabled partner. I am the only source of income. 
I am currently facing eviction as I am a month behind in rent. I am also facing a shut off 
for both water and electric. I am desperately seeking assistance but have thus far had 
no luck. I am doing everything I can to make ends meet and continue to come up short. 
I would greatly appreciate a low monthly payment to pay this fine off . . . .” 
Mo, 39: “I work 1 day a week . . . I understand i did all the above. I was going through a 
real rough time in my life. The officer only let me go because we were on our way to the 
shelter. It was really cold out that night. Im trying to right my wrongs. I really cant afford 
anymore jail time or tickets. Thats why im taking this really serious and im trying to get 
this matter taken care of.” 
Michelle, 29: “I have been having difficulty paying this ticket at the full amount because 
I have had unexpected costs arise every time I get paid, such as having to pay for my 
son’s prescriptions out of pocket and car repairs. I have little money left over after 
necessary living costs, such as food, gas to get back and forth to work, and child care for 
my son while I am at work. I do not receive any assistance for my child, although I have 
applied and been denied for benefits. I have moved back in with my parents after getting 
out of a violent relationship with my child’s father, and I received the ticket driving to 
get my son from daycare when he had a fever. A payment plan would make it easier for 
me to include in my budget.” 
 
 155.  Users were on average 33 years old, more likely to be female (53%), and often reported having 
at least one dependent with several reporting caring for a baby or being pregnant. Parents were often 
single or had a disabled partner or a noncontributing partner, and some indicated they were past victims 
of abuse and/or had struggled with homelessness. 
 156.  We use pseudonyms for litigants for anonymity. The quotations we present are verbatim with 
grammatical errors left unchanged. 
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Shonda, 24: “Single mom im trying to get on my feet. But only able to donate plasma 
for money for gas money for my son to get back and forth to school.” 
Ji, 36: “I am raising three children alone while attending school full time. . . . I am trying 
to get my license back before it gets really cold in Michigan . . . .” 
Maria, 50: “I’m experiencing hardship right now, my vehicle has been repossessed and 
I am seeking help for foreclosure. I am Currently jobseeking. Whatever little income 
I’ve been receiving through Facebook yard sale/yard sale ever tried to distribute to 
month-to-month bills. I would like to please request a review to possibly lower vibe of 
the payment until I can get employment to be able to afford more. . . .” 
Taneka, 23: “I have been homeless for the past 2 years. I am struggling to complete the 
CNA program at Central Tech. I am unable to get hired as a CNA because of the traffic 
warrants I have. The address and phone number I have provided belong to my mother 
because I currently cannot afford a phone.” 
Some may question the veracity of these litigant statements, but there are 
good reasons to think that litigants will be candid when they seek ability-to-pay 
relief from courts online—or at least no less honest than they would have been 
in a traditional face-to-face hearing.157 It is worth remembering that litigants’ 
online statements are made directly to judges, these statements are retained and 
remain accessible to the court, and courts can require that documentation 
verifying a litigant’s claims be submitted online. Litigants are also explicitly 
warned about the legal consequences of misleading the court,158 and they are 
asked to certify the truth of the information they supply.159 In any event, if these 
litigants are being truthful, their statements make plain that many would have 
struggled to access court in person for an ability-to-pay hearing. Many are not 
just low-income, but undereducated, disabled, and generally disadvantaged on 
many levels.160 For these litigants in particular, these preliminary data suggest 
that online platform technology may improve the accuracy of ability-to-pay 
assessments and reduce the social costs of noncompliance. 
 
 157.  Although intuition would suggest that lying to a judge online would be easier than lying to a 
judge’s face, the question of whether people are more likely to lie online is complicated and may depend 
critically on context. See Melissa Stanger, People Are Actually More Honest Online Than In Person, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 28, 2012), https://www.businessinsider.com/people-are-more-honest-online-
2012-12 [https://perma.cc/EB7J-72BX]. But see Raina Ducklow & Bud Mortenson, What Lies Behind the 
Online Words?, UBC REPORTS (Apr. 2, 2009), https://news.ubc.ca/2009/04/02/archive-ubcreports-2009-
09apr02-behind/ [https://perma.cc/4MEQ-XT6U]. 
 158.  As the litigants in our sample began the assessment, they were reminded: “Keep in mind—it’s a 
felony to provide false information to the court. If you say you’re unemployed or have zero cash and you 
actually have a good-paying job and few expenses, that’s going to be a problem. That said, the court isn’t 
going to throw you in jail if, for example, your checking account has $200 in it today and happens to be 
$400 when they review. Trust the court, just as the court trusts you to provide honest, truthful information 
in order to work out a fair game plan, so we can all move on!” 
 159.  Specifically, litigant users must agree to the following statement: “I certify under penalty of 
perjury that this financial statement is a complete and accurate statement of my income, assets, and 
expenses, and that I have no additional income.” 
 160.  WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 2012). 
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VI 
CONCLUSION 
For fines to work well as alternative sanctions in our justice system, courts 
need an accurate means of determining an individual’s ability to pay. For the 
poor, even modest fines for minor offenses can make compliance with the law 
cost prohibitive, and when an individual is unable to pay a fine, enforcement 
efforts (e.g., civil contempt sanctions) are not just ineffective but actually 
counterproductive, as they are expensive to impose and make it more difficult for 
individuals to earn what they owe. The U.S. Constitution prohibits a court from 
jailing someone who is unable to pay a certain fine amount,161 but current ability-
to-pay proceedings are unstructured and anemic, if they occur at all. Not 
surprisingly, many thousands of people a year who are rather demonstrably 
unable to pay their outstanding court debt are jailed notwithstanding their lack 
of financial means.162 This systematic inaccuracy is costly for these individuals, 
their families, the courts, and society. 
In the last few years, a number of states have sought to improve matters. Not 
surprisingly, most have focused on making the substance and process of ability-
to-pay determinations more robust.163 At least a few courts, however, have turned 
instead to online platform technology in the hopes of establishing consistent, 
efficient, and accurate ability-to-pay assessment hearings that take place online. 
Online assessment tools in particular seek to ease access issues—making it easier 
for litigants to make their case effectively and without missing work—while also 
collecting, distilling, and delivering all relevant information to judges in a more 
uniform, comprehensive, and efficient manner.164 
Although we rely on limited information in this study, our preliminary 
evidence suggests that online assessment tools very likely improve the accuracy 
of ability-to-pay determinations. We acknowledge that we present just one piece 
of the puzzle in this short article. We do not present a comprehensive picture of 
the tradeoffs of adopting online platform technology to resolve disputes, 
including the possibility that face-to-face hearings may be essential in some 
circumstances but prejudicial in others and that online interactions may be more 
or less open to litigant manipulation or judicial shirking than traditional 
courthouse proceedings. Even the empirical picture of improved access and 
efficiency that we do present is a tentative one. There is much work that remains 
to be done. 165 Nevertheless, the interview, survey, and case-level court data we 
analyze give us useful qualitative evidence on important dimensions of the 
relative attractiveness of online ability-to-pay determinations versus in-court 
proceedings. At a minimum, we learn that online ability-to-pay assessment 
 
 161.  Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983). 
 162.  Supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 163.  See supra Part IV. 
 164.  See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text. 
 165.  Some of this work has been done elsewhere. See generally Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 57; 
Prescott, supra note 13. 
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proceedings can improve communication between judges and litigants with 
respect to certain topics, that many litigants are unable to access traditional 
proceedings and can therefore end up with default outcomes that are often 
substantively incorrect, and that the online approach to transmitting case data is 
often more efficient and delivers more comprehensive information from the 
judge’s perspective, which presumably facilitates better decisions. Alone, these 
indicia suggest that online platform tools in general may have an important role 
to play in making the use of fines as sanctions fairer and more effective. 
 
